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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The case of Sessum v. Hemperley12 went through five hear-
ings, including rehearings in the court of appeal and Supreme
Court with reversals of the original opinion at each appellate
level. The last word on Article 852 is as follows. Where an in-
correct boundary has been evidenced by a visible marker (e.g.,
fence, in present case) and there has been uninterrupted posses-
sion up to that boundary for thirty years, then this boundary
becomes the legal boundary. The proprietor who has possessed
beyond his actual title description will, in these circumstances,
acquire full legal title to the extra strip of land, regardless of
the lack of consent of the adjacent owner to the establishment of
the boundary in the first place. This interpretation of Article
852 leaves the ten-year prescription of Article 853 for the situa-
tion where the visible boundary was established incorrectly but
with the consent or active acquiescence of both proprietors.
This interpretation fits well into the pattern of Civil Code
principles. If it sticks, it will be the marker to end the problem
and let it rest in peace.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY*
Harriet S. Daggett**
SUCCESSIONS
In Succession of Martin' a resident of New York left a will
appointing two residuary legatees. The testator had been named
residuary legatee in the will of Newton Blanchard Smith who
died possessed of property situated in Louisiana. At the time of
the testator's death he had not accepted the legacy bequeathed
to him and had not received any property from the executor of
the Smith estate. The issue presented for decision was whether
the residuary legatees who were entitled to receive the property
comprised in the legacy made by Smith to the deceased would
have to pay the Louisiana inheritance tax twice - once in the
Smith succession and again in the testator's succession in order
to receive the property once. The court held that only one tax
12. 233 La. 444, 96 So.2d 832 (1947), 18 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 742 (1958).
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend
Stephen J. Ledet, Jr., for his work in the preparation of these materials.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 566, 100 So.2d 509 (1958).
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was due - in the succession of Smith. The Louisiana inherit-
ance tax is levied upon the theory that the heir or legatee should
have in point of fact received a benefit from the inheritance
which falls to him, out of which benefit a portion is made to go
to the state.2 Thus the tax is not upon the property itself, but
upon the transmission of the property to the legatee. Although
under the substantive law of succession the heir succeeds to the
deceased from the instant of death, the heir is seised only of
right, and not in fact, until he accepts the succession and is sent
into or takes possession according to law. No inheritance is
exigible until the right of seisen is merged into seisen in fact of
particular property.
DONATIONS
Donations Inter Vivos
In Perot v. Arnold3 the administratrix of the succession of
the deceased brought suit to set aside certain purported dona-
tions inter vivos by the deceased to her nephew on the ground
that the deceased was at the time of the gifts mentally incompe-
tent. The administratrix was faced with a presumption of sanity
on the part of decedent and carried the burden of proving the
alleged lack of capacity by strong, clear, and convincing evi-
dence. The court held that the record amply sustained the find-
ing of the trial judge that the deceased did not possess sufficient
mental capacity to make the last two purported donations, but
administratrix failed to prove with the certainty required by law
decedent's total lack of capacity at the time of the first donation.
Donations Mortis Causa
In Succession of Eck4 decedent's niece filed an opposition to
the probate of the will asking that it be rescinded because of non-
compliance with the provisions of Act 66 of 1952, 5 and because
of the incompetency of one of the witnesses, who was the wife
of the legatee. The will contained two attestation clauses, one
immediately after the dispositive portion which was followed by
the signature of the testator, and a second which was followed
by the signature of the notary and two witnesses. The plaintiff
contended that the will was null for lack of proper form because
2. Succession of May, 120 La. 692, 45 So. 551 (1908).
3. 234 La. 68, 99 So.2d 26 (1958).
4. 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957).
5. LA. R.S. 9:2442 et 8eq. (1950).
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the testator had not signed along with the notary and the two
witnesses after the second attestation clause which would re-
quire a showing that the dispositive portion was executed and
signed at one and the same time in order to fulfill the require-
ments of the act. Still another ground alleged for the invalidity
of the will was the fact that the signature of the testator did not
appear at the literal or physical end of the will. The court held
that the will was proper in form. The purpose of the statutory
requirement that the testator and subscribing witnesses sign at
the end of the will is to prevent fraudulent additions to a will
before or after its execution. So long as all dispositive portions
of the will are above all signatures and the attestation clauses,
and all signatures are below the attestation clauses, and the sig-
nature of the testator is above all other signatures indicating
that the testator signed first, the will is valid. The court re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that the wife of the legatee
under the will was an incompetent witness. There are no pro-
visions in Act 66 of 1952 with respect to who may witness a will
drawn under its provisions. Under such circumstances the sub-
stantive law of the Civil Code applies and the wife of the legatee
did not fall within any of the incapacities there outlined.6
In Succession of Nourse7 the plaintiff, testamentary co-execu-
trix in a prior will, petitioned to have declared null and void a
will admitted to probate as the last will and testament of the de-
ceased. The will was executed under the provisions of Act 66 of
1952.8 It contained an attestation clause following the disposi-
tive portion after which appeared the signatures of the testator,
the notary, and two witnesses. The plaintiff contended that the
absence of the testator's signature at the place where the disposi-
tive portion terminated rendered the instrument null and void.
According to the act, it was contended, the testator's signature
should appear in two places, following the dispositive provisions
and at the end of the attestation clause. In rejecting plaintiff's
contention the court reaffirmed its position in Succession of Eck.
The requirement that the testator and subscribing witnesses
sign at the end of the will is to prevent fraudulent additions. The
term "end" refers to that place on the will where the dispositive
provisions terminate. The signatures of the witnesses are con-
6. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1591 and 1592 (1870).
7. 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 204 (1958).
8. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1950).
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sidered to be at the end of the will when there is no dispositive
matter intervening.
In Jones v. Mason9 plaintiffs sought to have probated a car-
bon copy of an olographic will which had been entirely written,
dated, and signed in the handwriting of the deceased. Evidence
showed that the deceased had prepared several copies of his will,
which he intended to distribute through the mail. After his
death, two identical carbon impressions of this will came to
light. One was found in the decedent's desk in an envelope ad-
dressed to himself at his home. The other was in the possession
of his sister in a sealed envelope. Because no first impression of
the will could be found, opponents of the will argued that there
had been a tacit revocation, relying on the rule that when an
olographic will, shown to have been in the possession of or ac-
cessible to the deceased, cannot be found at his death, there
arises a legal presumption of revocation by destruction. 10 In
finding that the carbon copy of the will should be admitted to
probate, the court held this to be a case of duplicate originals,
each original being of equal dignity and force with any other.
Any presumption of revocation that might have arisen because
one or more of these originals could not be found at the testator's
death was at most a weak one and was overcome by the fact that
the testator had preserved one of the duplicate originals in his
possession.
In Succession of Fisher," suit was brought by two surviving
brothers of the testator to have the will declared invalid on the
ground that the residuary legatee, the First Church of Christ,
Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts, was an unincorporated asso-
ciation and hence incapable of receiving donations mortis causa
under Louisiana law. The brothers also contended that because
of the unusual organization and doctrines of the Christian Sci-
ence religion, the Boston church, being the mother church, should
be held to be incapable under Civil Code Article 148912 of re-
ceiving a donation made to it by the testator, a member of the
Christian Science religion, during her last illness. The court
found that under particular provisions of Massachusetts law the
First Church of Christ, Scientist, although only an unincorpo-
rated association, had a legal right to inherit property. The
9. 234 La. 116, 99 So.2d 46 (1958).
10. Succession of Nunley, 224 La. 251, 69 So.2d 33(1953).
11. 235 La. 263, 103 So.2d 276 (1958).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE (1870).
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spirit of comity existing between the several states requires
Louisiana to recognize a legal right possessed under Massachu-
setts law, unless by so doing it would violate the positive law or
public policy of Louisiana. The court also rejected the plaintiff's
second contention. While recognizing the ingenuity of plaintiff's
argument, the court did not feel that the terms "doctors of physic
or surgeons" or "ministers of religious worship" used in Article
1489 could be interpreted to include a religious organization such
as the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts.
In Succession of Thilborger,13 collateral heirs brought suit to
have a provision of the testatrix's last will declared null as con-
stituting a prohibited substitution under Article 1520. The will
provided that to "my dear husband I give and bequeath the use
of... the Louise Plantation as long as he lives and at his death
to be given to the charity hospital." It was further provided that
if the testratrix and her husband should die together, all that
was bequeathed to her husband was to be given to the testatrix's
niece. The court held that the language of the will did not con-
stitute a prohibited substitution, but created in charity hospital
naked ownership of the property subject to a usufruct in the
husband. Such a disposition is perfectly valid under the Civil
Code. 14 In reaching its decision the court recognized the conflict
that exists in the jurisprudence on this subject and based its
finding on two recent cases 5 which held that where it is clear
from the language of the will that the testator does not intend to
vest title in the first named donee, then language to the effect
that this same donee is to be given the use of the property will
be construed to mean that the testator has created a usufruct in
favor of the first named donee with naked ownership in the
other. The court further held that the other provision in the will
bequesting to the niece all that had been given to the husband if
he should die at the same time as the testatrix was but a vulgar
substitution permissible under Article 1521 of the Civil Code.' 6
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Succession of Patti,17 a widow filed against the executor
of her husband's estate a rule to show cause why certain deposits
13. 234 La. 810, 101 So.2d 678 (1958).
14. LA. CviL CODE art. 1522 (1870).
15. Succession of Rougon, 223 La. 103, 65 So.2d 104 (1953); Succession of
Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So.2d 234 (1945).
16. LA. CIVIi CODE (1870).
17. 233 La. 723, 98 So.2d 166 (1957).
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in the name of her husband and herself should not be deleted
from the inventory and she be recognized as sole owner thereof
in view of her claim that the money in such accounts came from
her earnings - rentals from her separate property. Prior to the
time the deposits were made, the parties had been judicially sep-
arated from bed and board and subsequently reconciled, but the
community of acquets and gains, dissolved by the judgment of
separation from bed and board, had not been reestablished.' 8
The court held that, while the evidence introduced by the plain-
tiff did not support the claim that all of the deposits were made
exclusively by her from her own personal funds, there was proof
indicating that the deposits represented in part funds separately
owned by her. Since the deposits were in joint accounts, the
plaintiff as a partner in such joint accounts was entitled to one-
half interest therein.
In Taylor v. Dunn19 the court held that property acquired
during the existence of the community of acquets and gains is
presumed to be community property even though it is purchased
in the name of one of the spouses. In the absence of evidence
offered to prove otherwise, the husband as head and master of
the community is the proper party to prosecute its rights and de-
fend its interest. The wife alone can neither prosecute such a
claim nor defend an action against the community and stand in
judgment to bind it.
In Ruffino v. Hunt20 the court held that when separate prop-
erty of the husband is sold to a homestead association for cash
and simultaneously resold to him with no recitation that he was
acquiring property with his separate funds, such property does
not fall into the community of acquets and gains existing be-
tween husband and wife. This is the same result as had been ar-
rived at by the court previously concerning the separate prop-
erty of married women involved in such transactions.2' The
court reasoned that the statutory provision22 that such contracts
shall not be considered as loans but as sales and resales was lim-
ited in application to the contracting parties and those claiming
under them. The prime objective of the legislature was to have
homestead associations secured by a vendor's lien. It was never
its intention to produce a statutory change in the status of prop-
18. LA. CDUn CODE art. 155 (1870).
19. 233 La. 617, 97 So.2d 415 (1957).
20. 234 La. 91, 99 So.2d 34 (1958).
21. Mayre v. Pierson, 171 La. 1077, 133 So. 163 (1931).
22. LA. R.S. 6:766 (1950).
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erty from separate to community as the consequence of placing
a secured loan thereon.
In Johnson v. Johnson,28 several creditors sought to be paid
from funds realized from a judicial partition sale of community
property of husband and wife after their legal separation. The
community of acquets and gains had been dissolved almost two
years before the judicial sale of the property was held in order
to effect the partition. During this time the husband, with the
consent of the wife, continued to operate the chief community
asset, a tourist business, as a going concern. Among those claim-
ing against the fund realized from the partition sale were the
attorneys who represented the husband and wife in the partition
proceedings and other creditors who had furnished services to
the tourist business after the community was dissolved by the
judgment of separation. The attorneys contended that legal serv-
ices rendered in a contested partition of community property are
ordinarily chargeable against the community as costs of liquida-
tion. The other creditors allege that debts incurred by the hus-
band in administering the business after the judgment of sep-
aration were chargeable to the community. The court refused to
recognize these claims as charges against the community. With-
out answering the attorneys' contention that legal services ren-
dered in a partition of community property are chargeable
against the community, the court found that the operation of
the community business by the husband with the consent of the
other co-owner of the assets, his wife, was in the nature of a
partnership operation. 24 Since these co-owned assets were oper-
ated as a business entity, all the essential requirements for a
partnership relationship were met by the mutual agreement of
the former spouses that the husband should continue for their
mutual profit to operate the community's tourist business.
The court held that the business relationship thus established,
although not characterized as such by the parties, had the status
of a partnership with all the legal incidents thereof. Under Civil
Code Article 282325 partnership property is liable to the creditors
of the partnership in preference to those of the individual part-
ner. Therefore the claims for legal and other services, having
been rendered to this partnership relationship, although not ob-
23. 235 La. 226, 103 So.2d 263 (1958).
24. LA. CxVM Co E arts. 2801, 2805, 2806, 2809, 2811, and 2813 (1870).
25. LA. CIVIi CoDE (1870).
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ligations of the community were nevertheless partnership obliga-
tions, entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the partnership
sale before the proceeds were distributed to the co-owners.
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are Slater v. Culpepper,26 and Succession of Stans-
bury.27 These cases have been omitted from this discussion since
they involved no questions of substantial import. The court also
decided the case of Moore v. Suchei48 in which the vendor at-
tacked a notarial act of sale as being a disguised donation. This
case is discussed elsewhere in this symposium under the heading
Sale.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
There has been some question as to what extent, if any, the
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation as a breach of contract
obtains in Louisiana. This question was answered in Marek v.
McHardy,1 wherein the court said that an anticipatory breach
of contract is actionable in this state. Actually plaintiff did not
institute his suit in advance of the time performance of the repu-
diated obligation was due and the only question the court had to
decide was whether, in acting on the defendant's repudiation, he
had destroyed his right to the promised performance. In the
meantime there had been no retraction. 2 The court might have
decided, therefore, that the anticipatory repudiation dispensed
with the necessity of plaintiff's continuing his own performance
without expressing an opinion as to whether he would have been
able to maintain suit for breach of contract, on the strength of
the repudiation, prior to the time performance of the repudiated
obligation was due. That is, it might have restricted its inquiry
to the question of whether plaintiff, without completing his own
performance, had a right to damages for the defendant's breach.
In view of the reciprocal nature of a commutative contract it
26. 233 La. 1071, 99 So.2d 348 (1957).
27. 234 La. 924, 102 So.2d 218 (1958).
28. 234 La. 1068, 102 So.2d 459 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 234 La. 841, 101 So.2d 689 (1958).
2. It is questionable whether under the circumstances the repudiator should
have had a power of retraction. See 4 CoaDiN, CoNTaAcTS 932, 1 980 (1951).
